Abstract. Routing protocols for ad-hoc networks assume that the nodes forming the network are either under a single authority, or else that they would be altruistically forwarding data for other nodes with no expectation of a return. These assumptions are unrealistic since in ad-hoc networks, nodes are likely to be autonomous and rational (selfish), and thus unwilling to help unless they have an incentive to do so. Providing such incentives is an important aspect that should be considered when designing ad-hoc routing protocols. In this paper, we propose a dynamic, decentralized routing protocol for ad-hoc networks that provides incentives in the form of payments to intermediate nodes used to forward data for others. In our Constrained Selfish Routing (CSR) protocol, gametheoretic approaches are used to calculate payments (incentives) that ensure both the truthfulness of participating nodes and the fairness of the CSR protocol. We show through simulations that CSR is an energy efficient protocol and that it provides lower communication overhead in the best and average cases compared to existing approaches.
Introduction
Motivation: The design and implementation of practical routing protocols for ad-hoc networks is still an open and challenging problem, whose solution is critical for the widespread deployment of the many distributed applications envisioned for ad-hoc networks.
Most of the ad-hoc routing protocols proposed in the current literature presume that nodes are cooperative and are always willing to contribute their own resources (e.g., power, bandwidth, storage) in support of routing processes. In such settings, nodes are assumed to be truthful in the sense that intermediate nodes do not alter the content of forwarded packets and do not mischaracterize routing parameters so as to gain an advantage with respect to routing. However, in real settings, nodes of an ad-hoc network are under the control of individuals, who may not necessarily be cooperative. Indeed, such individuals are likely to be rational, selfish, or even malicious. Malicious nodes are those bent on disrupting the network functionality, whereas rational, selfish nodes are those that do not aim to disrupt the network, but are simply interested in maximizing the utility they beget from the network, even if doing so requires them to be untruthful.
Besides cooperative routing protocols, there have been several proposed routing protocols that provide incentives for nodes to help out in carrying the network load. Such incentives can be in the form of payment for cooperation [1, 7, 4, 8, 19, 18] or in the form of punishment (disincentives) for non-cooperation [3, 2] . In this paper, we focus on payment-based models, where nodes are rewarded for their help. In these models as well as in ours, a node would be willing to inform other nodes of its private (secret) costs for providing help in order to get paid, and a node would be willing to lie about its (or others') costs if this might lead to a higher payment.
To provide incentives for cooperating nodes, the routing problem is treated as a game where the nodes in the network are the players, each player's utility is the payments it receives, and the social optimum is to choose the most cost efficient route for packet delivery. Since there can be multiple routes between any pair of nodes in the network, we need to define a set of rules for the nodes to follow to choose this most cost efficient route. Moreover, we need to define the payoff functions used to calculate the payments for cooperating nodes. Mechanism design [9, 14] can be used to define the game's rules and payoff functions such that the social optimum is a dominant strategy for each player. A dominant strategy means that no player has an incentive to deviate from that strategy.
Related Work: Routing protocols for ad-hoc networks vary greatly in design and in the assumptions they make about the network. Several protocols assume that the nodes in the network are selfless (altruistic) and are willing to help other nodes when such help is needed [15, 16, 12, 13, 11] . The Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector routing (DSDV) protocol [15] is a proactive protocol which requires regular update of the routing table at the nodes. The disadvantages of such a design is that it consumes the power resources of the nodes and causes a significant communication overhead even when the network is idle. On the other hand, the Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol [16] and the Dynamic Source Routing protocol [12] are both reactive protocols, wherein routes are established on demand, thus reducing the communication overhead introduced by DSDV. In DSR, all the route information is kept in the control packets. This means that control packets grow larger as the route grows longer. This is in contrast to AODV where all route information is stored locally at the nodes and the control packet sizes remain constant. Therefore, AODV is largely considered a faster and less power-consuming protocol than DSR [13, 11] .
As we alluded earlier, in realistic settings, nodes are expected to be selfish, and thus would not help unless incentivised to do so (through the use of reward or punishment mechanisms). Example mechanisms that punish non-cooperative nodes through the use of reputation-based protocols include the works described in [3, 2] . Example mechanisms that reward cooperative nodes include the works described in [1, 7, 4, 18, 8, 19] . In [4] the intermediate nodes are paid with a virtual currency called NUGLETS. In [18] , Sprite is proposed which provides incentive -in a game theoretic sense -for mobile nodes to cooperate and report actions honestly. In [1] , the authors used mechanism design to provide the nodes incentives in the form of payments. Intermediate nodes are paid an amount of money proportional to the amount of power resources they consume for helping in addition to a small premium. The premium is calculated using the VCG model to guarantee the truthfulness of the nodes in the network. In [7] , the authors extended the protocol to provide the same incentives but with less communication overhead.
In Ad-hoc VCG [1] , the route discovery process is based on the DSR [12] protocol where the source node floods a request packet to all of its neighbors looking for a path to the destination. Each intermediate node appends to the request packet its own costs to send data. This information is forwarded to its neighbors and so on until the request reaches the destination node. The destination node collects all the requests flooded through the network and integrates them to build a complete logical view of the network. Using this information, the destination chooses the most cost-efficient path and uses a variation of the VCG model (named after Vickrey [17] , Clarke [6] and Groves [10] ) to calculate the payments to be given to each intermediate node in that path. Using the VCG payment model, the destination node calculates for each intermediate node (i) in the most cost efficient path (SP ) the cost of the second most-cost-efficient path without that node (SP −i ). As the intermediate node cooperates in delivering data from the source to the destination, it receives a payment to cover its costs plus a premium to ensure that the nodes would not lie about their secret costs. This premium is the difference between the costs of SP and SP −i . Paper Contributions and Organization: As mentioned above, the main disadvantage of DSR when compared to AODV is the increased communication overhead. In contrast, the Constrained Selfish Routing (CSR) protocol that we propose in this paper uses the Ad-hoc On demand Distance Vector (AODV) protocol [16] to decrease the communication overhead thus decreasing the power consumption at the nodes. In that respect, we design a mechanism that provides the most cost efficient path between a pair nodes in the network. It is a power efficient protocol that ensures the truthfulness of the nodes participating in it. We describe the system model in section 2, followed by a detailed description of the proposed Constrained Selfish Routing protocol in section 3. In section 4, we analyze the protocol's truthfulness properties and its overhead. In section 5, we evaluate the protocol's performance through simulations and provide results that support in an empirical setting the analytical results presented in section 4. Finally in section 6, we conclude the paper with a summary of our contributions.
System Model and Assumptions
We augment the model used by Anderegg and Eidenberz in [1] where the network is represented as a graph G = (V, E, w) with the set of vertices V that represent the mobile nodes in the network and the set of directed edges E which represents the unidirectional links between the nodes in the network. The weight function w : E− > R for each edge (i, j) represents the weight of the link between the node i and the node j, which is the cost of transmitting a packet from i to j.
Each node has a unique identifier i and has an individual cost of energy parameter c i . The cost of energy c i of a node i is its private type, i.e., only i knows its true value, which is a measure of the level of inconvenience the node faces when asked to forward a packet. One of the factors affecting this measure is the level of difficulty the node faces in order to recharge its power. The payment that a node receives for helping others is proportional to its cost of energy c i ; therefore, a node might lie about its true value of c i if such a lie would increase its payment.
All nodes use omni-directional antennas for communication, i.e., when a node sends a signal carrying a packet, all neighboring nodes in its transmission range receive that packet. We assume that nodes can control their signal emission power; as the node increases its emission power, its transmission range increases, and as a result more neighboring nodes receive the packets sent and vice versa. When a node i uses an emission power P emit i to send a packet, the node j at distance d from i receives the signal with power given by
where K is a constant and α is the distance power gradient, another constant that ranges between 2 and 6 depending on the network conditions. A node successfully receives a signal if the power of the received signal is above a certain acceptance threshold. While the acceptance threshold might differ from one node to another in the network, for simplicity, we assume that all nodes in the network agree on the same value for the acceptance threshold P rec min . If the power of the signal received exceeds P rec min , then j successfully receives the packet carried by the signal. However, the original emission power used by node i (P emit i ) might be overvalued and less emission power could have been used to successfully send a packet to j. Node j can calculate the minimum emission power that the node i would need to use to send a packet successfully to j using the following formula,
Once calculated, this value is sent back to i and later, i uses this value as its default emission power -if and when it needs to transmit a packet to j in the future.
The total weight of a link (i, j) is the product of the cost of energy c i and the minimum emission power that i uses to send a packet to j.
As previously mentioned, in the proposed protocol nodes will be paid to forward data for others. In [1] , the authors propose two payment models; either the source node is responsible for paying all intermediate nodes or some central authoritya "bank" -holds accounts for all nodes in the network and is responsible for all transactions performed on them. Any node can communicate with the bank if it is in its communication range. If the bank is inaccessible, a node is allowed to store the transaction information locally. This information is relayed to the bank as soon as the bank becomes accessible again in the future. In Ad-Hoc VCG, the authors assume that the bank will deduct the payments given to cooperating nodes from the accounts of all the nodes in the network. In this paper, we assume that the destination node is responsible for calculating the payments for each of the helping nodes and it sends the payment information to the bank. The bank credits the accounts of all the intermediate nodes and debits the accounts of the source and/or destination nodes.
Constrained Selfish Routing Protocol
The Constrained Selfish Routing protocol is an on-demand routing protocol for ad-hoc networks. The VCG payment model is used to provide incentives for nodes to help out other nodes in the network as used in [1] .
Overview
CSR consists of three components: route discovery, data transmission and route recovery.
When a node S needs to sends data to D but D is not in the transmission range of S, route discovery begins. In route discovery, S floods the network with a request to find a path to D and payments for the intermediate nodes are calculated. The route discovery phase will be explained in more details later in this section.
During data transmission, after the path from S to D is known, the data is sent between them and intermediate nodes get paid for forwarding the data. Whenever the destination node successfully receives a data packet, it keeps track of how much it should pay each intermediate node and when possible it notifies the bank of the payments.
Route recovery is activated when links between nodes are broken during data transmission. If the next hop node is not available for any reason (such as node failures, link failures, or node mobility), the node that detects the failure sends an ERROR packet back to the source node. Upon receipt of such an error report, the source node starts the route discovery all over again.
Route Discovery
The route discovery in CSR is adapted from the AODV routing protocol, which is an on demand ad-hoc routing protocol proposed by Perkins and Royer in [16] . AODV provides several advantages in ad-hoc networks such as low communication overhead and less power consumption. In CSR, the route discovery phase is divided into two separate phases: the first phase is the actual discovery phase when the most cost-efficient path between the source and destination is found. The second phase is when the payment calculation occurs. Nodes do not have to wait for the termination of this phase to start data transmission as it can start on the completion of the first phase. The second phase can be performed offline and at any time after the first phase is completed or during data transmission.
Phase 1: Finding a route. The first phase is similar to the route discovery phase in AODV [16] where a source node S floods the network with its request to a destination node D. Then S has to wait for D to send out a reply with the most cost efficient path between them to start data transmission. Packets Used: Two types of packets are used in this phase; the REQUEST and the REPLY packets.
The REQUEST packet is the packet that floods the network. In addition to the typical ID and addressing fields that constitute the Packet header, this packet contains a Cost of Energy field, in which the cost of energy of the inner source node sending the current instance of the packet. The packet also contains an Emission Power field which indicates the emission power that the inner source is using to send the current instance of the packet and a Total Weight field which represents the total weight of the path from the source node to the inner source node.
The REPLY packet is sent out by D and it contains information about the most cost-efficient path between S and D. It is only forwarded by the nodes in the best path between S and D. It contains the Packet Header, the original Request ID and the List of Costs, a list that includes the ID, cost of energy and the minimum power of each intermediate node along the chosen path. Data Structures Used: During route discovery, each node needs to maintain two data structures to help out in the route discovery phase.
The Best Route Cache is used to store the best REQUEST packet received for a specific request between a pair of nodes. Its key index is the Request ID + Source + Destination values of the REQUEST packet and its value is the REQUEST packet itself.
The Neighbor Cache is used to keep track of which of the nodes neighbors can provide a path to the source node. Its key index is the Request ID + Source + Destination values obtained from the original REQUEST and its value is a list of node IDs which represent the neighbors of the node that previously sent a corresponding REQUEST to the node. Details of Phase 1: When a source node S wishes to find a path to a destination D, it prepares the initial REQUEST packet with its cost of energy and emission power and floods it to its neighbors.
When a node j receives a REQUEST packet from neighbor i it follows Algorithm 1 to decide whether to drop the packet or forward it. The weight in the packet is updated and forwarded if the packet carries a better weight than the best weight stored in the Best Route Cache. When the destination node receives the first REQUEST from the source node, it follows the same algorithm but without forwarding the packet with the best weight, and keeps listening for other route REQUEST packets in case a better REQUEST is received from the same source node. If a better REQUEST is received, the corresponding entry in the best route cache is updated. After a timeout period expires, the destination extracts the best REQUEST it received from neighbor i from the Best Route Cache and sends out a REPLY packet with {c(i), Pmin(i,D)} to the source node through i. Each intermediate node i receiving the reply packet from node j will follow Algorithm 2 to decide the uplink node to which the edited reply should be forwarded.
Algorithm 2 Actions performed by a node i upon receiving a REPLY packet from node j. best = corresponding best REQUEST packet from Best Route Cache k = inner source of best Forward REPLY to k with {c(k), Pmin(k,i)} added to the list of costs
Once the source node receives the REPLY packet, it can enter the data transmission phase and does not have to wait for the second phase to end.
Phase 2: Payments Calculation. While route discovery allows the destination D to identify the best (most cost-effective) path, D is unable to calculate the payments to the intermediate nodes along that path. As we indicated earlier, in CSR these payments are based on a VCG model, requiring the calculation of the second-best path when each node on the best path is excluded. This process is carried out in Phase 2 of the CSR protocol. This phase is similar to the route discovery performed in phase 1, except that it is done in the opposite direction (from D to S) and the request packets have constraints to not include certain nodes in the discovery.
To start phase 2, S sends to D information about the intermediate nodes in the best path between them. This is done by piggy-backing a CONFIRM packet to the first DATA packet send to D.
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Packets Used: We introduce 3 types of packets in this phase, namely, the CONFIRM, FIND and FOUND packets. The CONFIRM packet is piggy-backed with the first DATA packet sent by the source node S. It is used to inform the destination node D about the details of the intermediate nodes in the chosen shortest path (SP ) between S and D. There is only one field in the CONFIRM packet, namely the list of costs that were obtained from the REPLY packet in phase 1. When sending a DATA packet, the source node S signs and appends this list to the packet.
The FIND packet is used to discover whether a path between two nodes without a certain intermediate node. Its fields are the Packet Header with multiple inner destinations, the Excluded Node, the original Request ID and the Hop Count which is used to calculate the time out period the node will spend before sending the FOUND packet.
The reply to the FIND packet is the FOUND packet which is used by nodes in the second phase to notify the originator of the FIND packet that a path is indeed found excluding a specific node and it also carries the total weight of that found path. Its fields are the Packet Header with multiple inner destinations, the Excluded Node, original Request ID, Total Weight of the path and the Cost of Energy and Emission Power of the node sending the FOUND packet. Data Structures Used: During phase 2, each node needs to also maintain similar data structures as those kept in phase 1 but for the FIND and FOUND packets.
The first data structure is the Find Neighbor Cache which is used to track which neighbors sent similar FIND packets to the node. It is used to keep track of which neighbors have previously sent a FIND packet, to guarantee that only one FIND and one FOUND packets are sent for each request. Its index key is also the Request ID + Source + Destination values of the original REQUEST packet and its value is a list of neighbors.
The second data structure is the Best Found Cache which is used to store the best FOUND packet received so far for each corresponding FIND packet. The index key of this data structure is also the Request ID + Source + Destination When the source node receives a FIND packet with itself in the Destination field, it will send a FOUND packet to the Inner source of the FIND packet.
During the timeout period, when a node j (including the destination node D) receives a FOUND packet from node i, it will decide whether to store the FOUND packet in the Best Found Cache or just drop it according to Algorithm 5.
When the timer at node i stops, i will extract the best FOUND packet received from the Best Found Cache and extract the set of neighbors from the Find Neighbor Cache. Then the node updates the fields in the FOUND packet When the D finishes its timeout period, it takes the information in the Best Found Cache and calculates the payments that should be made to each intermediate node using the following formula: 
Analysis
In CSR, since nodes only forward requests with better total weights, we guarantee that the most cost efficient route is always chosen in phase 1 in the route discovery. As for the incentives provided to the nodes in the network, our VCGbased payment model guarantees the truthfulness of all the nodes in the network. Theorem 1. CSR guarantees the truthfulness of all the nodes in the network.
Proof. The payment of each node
which is its utility. As mentioned before, node i may be untruthful (i.e., lie about its type) in order to increase its utility. Let us consider the various possible ways that an intermediate node may be untruthful. We start by noting that in phase 2, nodes do not have an incentive to lie about the values of c i , P emit i , P min i,j , or even change any of the values in the packets being forwarded. This is so because the nodes participating in phase 2 cannot change their utility (which is determined by the processes in Phase 1). Thus, in our analysis below, we consider the behavior of a node in Phase 1.
We also note that any increase in c i or P emit i declared by a node i has no effect on the node's utility because the added value to the utility in c i * P min i,j is also added to |SP | which is then decreased from the utility resulting in the same utility. Similarly, decreasing the declared value of c i or P emit i has no effect on the node's utility.
With respect to the first case, if a node on the most cost-efficient path underdeclares the values of c i or P , then the node risks loosing out, since such misrepresentation may result in another path being selected as the most cost-efficient path. Thus, we conclude that a node on the most cost-efficient path has no incentive to under-declare or over-declare the values of c i or P , and such misrepresentation results in the selection of a path including that node, then the node utility will be negative because the payment it receives will be less than the actual cost. Clearly, if such a node over-declares the values of c i or P emit i , then the node will certainly not be chosen since any path it is on will be even less attractive. Thus, we conclude that a node that is not on the most cost-efficient path has no incentive to under-declare or over-declare the values of c i or P emit i . With respect to the second case, if a node j under-declares the minimum emission power P min i,j and it gets chosen in the most-cost efficient path, it will cause its predecessor node i to use this under-declared value P min i,j as emission energy when forwarding data to it in the data transmission phase thus preventing successful communication between i and j. On the other hand, if node j overdeclares the minimum emission power P min i,j for its predecessor i, it might prevent itself from being chosen in the most cost-efficient path. However, if it does get chosen, j will receive a smaller payment because the value of |SP | will increase thus lowering its utility. Therefore, a node j has no incentive to be untruthful about the minimum emission power P min i,j . With respect to the third case, we note that a node may have an incentive to change existing entries in the list of costs in the REPLY packet or in the CONFIRM packet. In CSR, this is prevented through the use of cryptographic methods. When forwarding the REPLY packet, each node signs the entry it adds to the list of costs, thus preventing other nodes from editing the information in the list of costs. As for the CONFIRM packet, the source node signs the whole list of costs, thus preventing other nodes from editing the information in the list of costs.
A very important aspect of an ad-hoc routing protocol is its communication overhead because it affects the performance of the network and the power consumption at the nodes. We prove that CSR has a linear lower bound on the number packets sent and that the (worst-case) upper bound on the number of overhead packets is equal to that of the Ad-Hoc VCG protocol [1] .
Theorem 2. The lower bound on the overhead of CSR in terms of the number of packets sent is O(n).
Proof. The route discovery phase of CSR is divided into 2 phases. In Phase 1, each node only forwards the incoming REQUEST packet if it has a better weight that the REQUEST packet already forwarded. In the best case scenario, the first REQUEST packet received by each node has the best weight and the node would only send out one REQUEST packet for each request made from the source to the destination. In this case, the total number of packets sent is n − 1 packets.
Phase 2 is designed in a such a way that each node only sends one FIND packet and one FOUND packet in all scenarios. Therefore, the total number of packets sent in this phase is 2k(n − 1) where k is the number of intermediate nodes in the most cost efficient path between the source and the destination.
Thus, O(n) is a lower bound on the overhead of CSR in terms of the number of packets sent. Proof. In the worst-case scenario in phase 1, the REQUEST packets received by a node would be in decreasing order in terms of their total weight. Thus, the node would send out every REQUEST packet received for each request from the source to the destination. Following the analysis in [7] , we compute that the total number of packets sent in this case would be n 4 packets. In phase 2, each node only sends one FIND and one FOUND packet in all scenarios and the total number of packets sent is 2k(n−1) where k is the number of intermediate nodes in the most cost efficient path between the source and the destination.
Thus, O(n 4 ) is an upper bound on the overhead of CSR in terms of the number of packets sent.
Simulation Results
An event-based simulator was designed to simulate ad-hoc networks and to test the performance of various routing protocols. Using this simulator, the performance of CSR is compared to Ad-Hoc VCG [1] . The simulations were run in a closed environment in which any number of simulated nodes move freely.
The mobility model used in the simulator is adopted from the Random Walk model [5] . Initially, each node picks a random direction (Θ) taken from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, 2Π]. The node moves in the chosen direction for a fixed period (default is 4 seconds) and then pauses for another fixed period of time (a control variable). Next, the node picks a new random direction (Θ ) taken from a uniform distribution on the interval [Θ − 20, Θ + 20] and repeats the same process. The reason for choosing the interval [Θ − 20, Θ + 20] when deciding Θ is to simulate a realistic motion.
Applications on the simulated wireless nodes are designed to send data to random destinations (picked uniformly at random) at random times, with intermessaging time picked from an exponential distribution with a mean of 10. Once a destination is chosen, the route discovery process of the simulated protocol starts.
Four sets of simulations were performed to measure the efficiency of CSR in various conditions. In all simulations, the environment is 500m × 500m in size, the nodes' transmission range is 100m and the total simulation time is 100sec. The measured performance parameters are the Communication overhead which is represented in two forms: the total number of packets sent out during the route discovery phase, the total number of bytes sent out during the route discovery phase, and the Power consumption rate which measures the average rate of power consumed by the nodes during the whole simulation.
In the first set of simulations, the number of nodes in the network is varied from 8 to 12 devices, the pause time of each node is 6 sec and the total number of requests made in each simulations is 5 requests. The performance evaluation of the protocols is shown in Figure 1 In the second set of simulations, the number of requests made in the simulation is varied from 2 to 20 requests, the number of nodes in the network is 8 and the pause time of each node is 6 sec. The performance evaluation of the protocols is shown in Figure 3 . Each value in the graph represent an average of 5 simulation runs with different seeds within a 90th-percentile confidence interval.
The results show that as the the number of requests made in the network increases, the communication overhead in both CSR and Ad-Hoc VCG increases linearly. However, the degree of increase in the overhead of CSR is less than that of Ad-Hoc VCG because of the linear overhead of CSR in terms of the number of nodes in the average case compared to the super-linear overhead of Ad-Hoc VCG. In the third set of simulations, the pause time of the nodes is varied between 6 seconds and 2 seconds. In these simulations, the number of nodes in the network is set to 8 and the number of requests in the simulation is 5. The performance evaluation of the protocols is shown in Figure 4 . Each value in the graph represent an average of 5 simulation runs with different seeds within a 90th-percentile confidence interval.
The results show that both protocols are stable as the mobility of the nodes increases i.e., as the pause time decreases. Moreover, CSR shows an improved performance over Ad-Hoc VCG. In the fourth set of simulations, we compare the average weights of the routes chosen by CSR to those chosen by vanilla AODV. If power was not an issue in the network, AODV would have been simpler to use. However, we consider adhoc networks with limited power resources. Therefore, choosing power-efficient routes is more desirable that just choosing the shortest routes. In CSR, if the cost of energy of the nodes in the network are constant, then the routes chosen are the most power-efficient routes. In these simulations the number of nodes in the network is varied from 8 to 12 devices, the pause time of each node is 6 sec and the total number of requests made in each simulations is 5 requests. The results shown in Figure 5 are obtained by comparing the average route weight of CSR to that of AODV where all nodes have unit cost of energy. 
Conclusion
The CSR protocol is an incentive-based routing protocol which provides incentives for selfish nodes in the network in a game theoretic setting. In this paper, we have shown CSR to induce thruthful node behavior through the use of a VCG-based model for calculation of payments to intermediate nodes. With truthfulness guaranteed, CSR provides the most cost efficient path between any pair of nodes in an ad-hoc network with a linear lower bound of O(n) on the communication overhead, where n is the number of nodes in the network. The lower communication overhead also guarantees lower power consumption.
